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CHINA'S COMPETITION POLICY REFORMS: THE
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND BEYOND
BRUCE M. OWEN
Su SUN
WENTONG ZHENG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States once characterized antitrust
law as the "Magna Carta" of free enterprise.' By promoting free and fair
competition, antitrust law has supported market economies in the West
in several important ways. First, it promotes economic efficiency, by
making sure that goods are made by the firm that can produce them at
lowest cost, and that goods flow to those consumers who value the goods
the most. Second, antitrust law seeks to protect customers, both individ-
uals and businesses, against the wealth transfers that accompany the cre-
ation and exercise of undue market power. Third, antitrust law is an
aspect of broader competition policy, which seeks to promote private
competitive markets as alternatives to State-owned enterprises or regu-
lated monopolies.
For countries that have operated under centrally planned economic
systems, however, "competition" often is an unfamiliar concept. Such
countries must learn the importance of competition as an institution as
their centrally planned economies are transformed into market-ori-
ented economies. Increasingly, they look to the antitrust laws developed
in Western countries for guidance in designing their competition
policies.
* Bruce Owen is the Morris M. Doyle Centennial Professor in Public Policy at Stanford
University, and the Gordon Cain Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic
Policy Research. Su Sun is a Senior Economist at the Washington, D.C. office of Econo-
mists Incorporated. Wentong Zheng is an attorney in Washington, D.C. The views ex-
pressed in this article are entirely the authors' own and do not reflect the views of the
organizations with which the authors are affiliated.
I United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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After China began its historic transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy in the late 1970s, it gradually came to
realize that good competition policies would be of vital importance to its
economic growth. As a result, China began experimenting with reform
measures and enacting antitrust laws and regulations aimed at promot-
ing competition in its economy. At first, China adopted a piecemeal ap-
proach, passing laws and regulations dealing with isolated competition
issues as they arose. As competition issues became increasingly promi-
nent, China recognized the importance of having a comprehensive anti-
trust law. In 1994, China began its efforts to enact the Anti-Monopoly
Law (AML), China's first comprehensive antitrust legislation.
Thirteen years later, on August 30, 2007, China's National People's
Congress (NPC) finally adopted the AML.2 The AML has provisions
found in most other countries' antitrust laws, such as the prohibition of
horizontal agreements and abuse of market power, and requirements
for pre-merger notifications and reviews. The AML also contains many
provisions not typical of antitrust laws, such as provisions regarding
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in important economic sectors, trade
associations, and monopolies created by government agencies.
The AML was adopted only after a painstaking drafting process, which
included numerous drafts, seminars, debates, and behind-the-scenes
jockeying. When a law takes so long to enact in China, that usually signi-
fies that it is highly controversial. Indeed, the AML was drafted during a
period in which China was trying to consolidate its powerful SOEs in
important sectors, there was widespread perception of "excessive" com-
petition, mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign in-
vestors increased concerns, government agencies were responsible for
the most significant restrictions on competition, and it was uncertain
how the proposed antitrust law would be enforced. These complications
prolonged debates on the AML.
These same fundamental issues-and how China deals with them-
will determine the effectiveness of the AML and China's future competi-
tion policy reforms. The AML reflects many compromises on these is-
sues made to facilitate enactment, and did not resolve the most
2 See Antimonopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug. 30, 2007 and effective Aug. 1,
2008) [hereinafter AML], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/
zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=371229&pdmc=11006. The translations provided in this article
are the authors'. An unofficial English translation is also available as an appendix to Na-
than Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, ANTi-
TRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2007, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/OctO7-
BushlO-18f.pdf.
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controversial issues surrounding the earlier drafts. Those issues will pose
continued challenges to China's antitrust enforcers. Understanding
these issues, therefore, is crucial to understanding the AML and the fac-
tors affecting the future of China's competition policy reforms.
There have been many technical commentaries on the draft AML
from the perspective of a Western antitrust practitioner. We do not rep-
licate such efforts. Instead, we review the systemic challenges facing the
drafting and enforcement of the AML and China's broader competition
policy reforms, and the provisions of the AML that relate to those chal-
lenges, i.e., the role of SOEs, perceived excessive competition, mergers
and acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign investors, administra-
tive monopolies, and enforcement.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S ANTITRUST LAWS
A. CHINA'S ANTITRUST LAVS AND RULES PRIOR TO THE AML
Prior to the AML, China's competition policy was contained in a num-
ber of laws and administrative rules. The most comprehensive of these is
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, promulgated in 1993.1 The Anti-Un-
fair Competition Law contains some provisions commonly found in anti-
trust law, such as prohibition of tie-in sales and prohibition of price
fixing and bid rigging. But the Anti-Unfair Competition Law also ad-
dresses many other issues, including bribery, deceptive advertising, coer-
cive sales, and appropriation of business secrets. To a large extent, the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law is more like a consumer protection law
than an antitrust law.
Antitrust provisions are also scattered throughout other, more special-
ized laws. For example, the Commercial Banking Law, passed in 1995,
includes an article that prohibits banks from engaging in "improper
competition. '4 The Price Law, passed in 1997, has provisions against
"improper pricing behaviors" including price fixing, predatory pricing,
and price discrimination. 5 The Procurement and Bidding Law, passed in
3 Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Sept. 2, 1993 and effective
Dec. 1, 1993). (Translation available by subscription at http://www.chinalawinfo.com.)
4 Article 9 of the Law of Commercial Banking of the People's Republic of China (effec-
tive May 10, 1995, as amended on Dec. 27, 2003), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
rhwg/19981802.htm (official Chinese text).
5 Article 14 of the Price Law (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress on Dec. 29, 1997 and effective May 1, 1998), available at http://www.
gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-09/12/content_31188.htm. (Translation available by subscrip-
tion at http://www.chinalawinfo.com.)
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1999, prohibits bid rigging.6 Most recently, China revised the 2001 Pat-
ent Law for the third time, adding provisions under Chapter Six (com-
pulsory licensing) against patent abuse when that abuse excludes or
restricts competition. 7
More often, competition issues are directly addressed by the issuance
of administrative rules and regulations. In some cases administrative
rules are used to address new issues that require a quick response. In
other cases they provide more detailed interpretations of previously
promulgated laws. Some important administrative rules regarding com-
petition issues include the following.
* In 1993, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) issued Certain Provisions on Prohibiting Public Utility En-
terprises from Committing Restrictive Acts Against Competition s
intended to rein in widespread abuse of monopoly positions by
public utility companies.
" In April 2001, the State Council, China's cabinet, issued the Rules
on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities. 9
These Rules address a major form of administrative monopoly in
which local government agencies deliberately discriminate against
products and services provided from other localities and often sim-
ply deny them access to the local market.
* In 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission issued
the Provisional Rules on Prevention of Monopoly Pricing.'0 The
Rules prohibit the abuse of "market dominance" and infer domi-
nance from "market share in the relevant market, substitutability of
6 See Article 32 of the Procurement and Bidding Law (promulgated by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug. 30, 1999 and effective Jan. 1,
2000), available at http://xinxiangxian.xx.gov.cn/lmz/juwei/shenji/flfg/kjfg37.htm.
(Translation available by subscription at http://www.clrsonline.com).
7For China's current Patent Law (second revision), see http://www.npc.gov.cn/
was40/detail?record=l&channelid=20179&searchword=%20(%20%D6%DO%BB%AA%
C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%D7%A8%C0%FB%B7%A8+%29+and+%
28+IDS%3D%277370'%20). The third revision is now under review.
8 See Certain Provisions on Prohibiting Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Re-
strictive Acts Against Competition (promulgated by the State Administration of Industry
and Commerce on Dec. 24, 1993), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/
Decision/cndec05.html.
9 See Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities (promul-
gated by the State Council Apr. 29, 2001 and effective Apr. 29, 2001), available at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/20010429/456075.html.
10 See Interim Provisions on Preventing Acts of Price Monopoly, Order [2003] No. 3
(adopted by the State Planning and Development Commission on June 18, 2003 and
effective Nov. 1, 2003), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/zcfbl2003/t2005
06136683.htm. (Translation available by subscription at http://www.chinalawinfo.com.)
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relevant goods, and ease of new entry." The Rules also prohibit
price coordination, supply restriction, bid rigging, vertical price re-
straint, below-cost pricing, and price discrimination as abuses of
dominance. Finally, the Rules prohibit government agencies from
"illegally intervening" in market price determination.
These regulations generally did not have a clear and credible enforce-
ment mechanism, and their implementation has been largely
ineffective."
To address rising concerns about foreign acquisitions of Chinese com-
panies, six government agencies jointly issued the Rules on Acquisitions
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (M&A Rules) in 2006.12
Article 51 of the M&A Rules lays out the four conditions under which
premerger notification to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
and the SAIC is required. The four conditions include thresholds that
relate to annual sales, the number of enterprises the foreign party has
previously acquired in related industries, the merging parties' market
shares before and after the merger. The M&A Rules, however, suffered
from a number of deficiencies. 1
To aid the implementation of the M&A Rules, in March 2007
MOFCOM posted on its Web site the Antitrust Filing Guidelines. 4 The
Guidelines mostly resemble similar guidelines and procedures adopted
by other jurisdictions and are helpful for parties who wish to understand
" See, for example, a Ministry of Commerce official's comment in 2004 that regional
blockade was the major obstacle in forming a national market, available at http://
www.icn.com.cn/Fujian-w/gnxw/20040623t/gn139079.html, and some National Peo-
ple's Congress Standing Committee members' comments in 2007 on the ineffective regu-
lation of monopoly pricing, http://www.npc.gov.cn/xinwen/lfgz/lfdt/2007-06/26/
content_367777.htm.
12 Rules on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, http://www.
xasmw.com/rule/content.asp?id=254 (unofficial Chinese text). A provisional rule that
had essentially the same content on antitrust review was issued in 2003. Provisional Regu-
lations Regarding Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, State Adminis-
tration of Taxation, State Administration of Industry and Commerce, and State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange on Mar. 13, 2003 and effective Apr. 12, 2003), available at
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/i/s/200509/20050900366385.html. (Transla-
tion available by subscription at http://www.chinalawinfo.com.)
13 For a brief discussion of some of the problems in the M&A Rules, such as the use of
the number of acquired enterprises "in related industries" and "market shares" as notifi-
cation thresholds, see Su Sun, Antitrust Review in China's New Merger Regulation, ECONO-
MISTS INK, Winter 2007, available at http://www.ei.com/ink/Winter_2007.pdf.
14 See Antitrust Filing Guidelines, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bb/200704/
20070404597464.html (official Chinese text).
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when and what to file. The Guidelines' filing requirements, however,
have been criticized as overly burdensome to merging parties.' 5
B. THE AML
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, China's antitrust laws
and regulations prior to the AML were fragmented, vague, and repeti-
tive, and the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement was hampered by the
existence of multiple enforcement agencies authorized by different
laws. Partly as a response to the shortcomings of its existing antitrust
rules, China began its efforts to enact the comprehensive AML to con-
solidate the antitrust provisions into a uniform set of rules.'
6
Two government agencies, the State Economic and Trade Commis-
sion (SETC) and the SAIC, were charged with drafting the AML in 1994,
soon after the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law was promulgated. The
SETC was abolished in a government restructuring in 2003 and
MOFCOM has since taken its place as the main drafter of the AML.' 7 By
2002, a draft had taken shape and soon began circulating in small cir-
cles for comment. A number of revisions followed during the next two
years, and in March 2004 a draft law was submitted to the State Council
Legislative Affairs Office for its review. After several more revisions, a
draft was submitted to the NPC Standing Committee for its first review
in June 2006, on which the NPC Standing Committee commented.'8 A
further revised draft was commented on during the NPC Standing Com-
mittee's second review in late June 2007.19 The NPC Standing Commit-
15 The ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice have made
detailed comments on the Guidelines. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Comments of the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law on The Guidelines on Anti-
trust Fillings for Mergers & Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Mar. 3,
2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2007/03-07/comm-
PRC.pdf.
16 The drafting of a bill in China is usually done by the Commission for Legislative
Affairs under the NPC. Other government bodies, such as the State Council and the min-
istries that would be responsible for enforcing the proposed law, also have the authority
to draft a bill. Draft bills are sent to the NPC for its review. Bills can be enacted either by
the plenary session of the NPC or by its Standing Committee. There are no legal require-
ments on the number of NPC reviews a bill must undergo before it can be approved. The
number of reviews a bill receives from the NPC will depend on its importance, complex-
ity, and the controversies it presents.
17 See Ming Shang, China's Competition Policy and Legislation in Development (Apr. 22,
2005), http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/dzgg/f/200504/20050400081489.html.
18 The NPC Standing Committee members made a number of comments during their
first review. See http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350
218&pdmc=110106.
19 For the content of the six added provisions in the latest draft and some NPC Stand-
ing Committee members' comments during their second reading, see http://
www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/flzt/index.jsp?lmid=15&dm=1520&pdmc=ch.
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tee approved the final draft of the AML during its third review on
August 30, 2007.20
The AML drafting process, though not public and transparent, did
involve a small circle of experts and practitioners, both from China and
from other parts of the world. Seminars and conferences were held in
China and in other jurisdictions, including the United States and Eu-
rope. Foreign enforcement officials, scholars, and practicing attorneys
frequently spoke at seminars and conferences and commented on the
drafts. The American Bar Association alone made several rounds of
comments on different drafts of the AML.21 The various revisions of the
draft AML appear to have incorporated comments by various parties.
Through these many rounds of comments and revisions, the AML was
improved substantially, and Chinese government officials also seem to
have gained more knowledge and better understanding about competi-
tion issues generally.
The AML, as approved, consists of eight chapters.22 Chapter One de-
scribes the general principles of the AML, including objectives, applica-
bility, coverage, the role of SOEs in important sectors, the role of trade
associations, and the two proposed antitrust enforcement agencies.
Chapter Two describes which monopoly agreements are prohibited and
which are exempted. Chapter Three prohibits the abuse of a market
dominant position. It provides methods to infer dominance and de-
scribes abusive behaviors. Chapter Four provides for agency review of
proposed mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, and outlines the re-
view procedures. Chapter Five is devoted to prohibitions of anticompeti-
tive activity by government agencies. This chapter incorporates some of
the prior administrative rules and focuses in particular on various forms
of local protectionism. Chapter Six describes the investigative procedure
to be followed by the enforcement agency. Chapter Seven describes lia-
20 An official Chinese text of the AML can be found at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/
2007-08/30/content_732591 .htm.
21 See ABA, Joint Submission of the American Bar Association's Sections of Antitrust Law and
International Law and Practice on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of
China (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2003/
07-03/jointsubmission.pdf; see also Am. Bar Ass'n,Joint Submission of the American Bar Associ-
ation 's Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law & International Law and Practice on
the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, May 20, 2005, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2005/05-05/commentsprc2OO5wapp.pdf;
and the July 2005 Supplement, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2005/07-
05/abaprcat2005-2final.pdf.
22 We made detailed comments on a similar, earlier draft of the AML. See Bruce Owen,
Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility, 1 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2005). We agree with much of the commentaries on the
draft law offered by the American Bar Association, supra note 21.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Antitrust L.J. 237 2008-2009
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
bility and penalties for violating the AML. Chapter Eight states that agri-
cultural activities are generally exempted, and that an intellectual
property right is not to be regarded as a per se unlawful monopoly but
that the abuse of such rights to restrict competition is subject to the
AML.
Chapter Eight also states that the effective date of the AML is August
1, 2008. The AML does not specify whether the previous antitrust-re-
lated laws and regulations will remain effective after the AML takes ef-
fect. However, in China's legal culture, more recent and more general
legislation takes precedence over less recent and less general legislation
and regulations. It is expected that future antitrust enforcements in
China will be based on the AML, and that before August 1, 2008, China
will promulgate regulations necessary to implement the AML.
III. CHINA'S ECONOMIC, REGULATORY, AND
LEGAL CONTEXTS
To understand the fundamental issues giving rise to the challenges
facing China's competition policy reforms in general and the drafting
and enforcement of the AML in particular, a brief discussion of China's
economic, regulatory, and legal contexts in which those issues arise is in
order.2 The formulation of competition policy in a country does not
happen in a vacuum; instead, it is closely tied to the economic, political,
and legal contexts of the country. This is particularly so in China. The
AML was being drafted-and will be enforced-against the backdrop of
China's historic transformation from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy.
A. CHINA'S ECONOMIC CONTEXT
When economic reforms began in 1978, China's economy was domi-
nated by the State, and private enterprises played only a negligible role.
With factories essentially being units of the State productive machinery,
there was little role for competition. At times the government promoted
"labor competition" among factories or production units in an effort to
indoctrinate the populace with communist ideology, but competition
motivated by profits was condemned as a symptom of corrupt capitalist
systems. The subsequent establishment of the household responsibility
system in rural areas and the contract responsibility system in SOEs
greatly increased the economic incentive to work.
23 For a somewhat more detailed but less up-to-date discussion, see Owen, Sun &
Zheng, supra note 22.
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In 1992, China significantly accelerated its pace of economic reform
after the inspection tour of the southern regions by its paramount
leader, Deng Xiaoping. In the fall of 1992, the Fourteenth Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party officially declared that the central goal of
China's economic reform is to establish a "socialist market economy." In
the following decade, far-reaching reform measures were undertaken to
overhaul China's SOE sector, taxation, banking, and foreign currency
systems. Private enterprises grew rapidly, and large amounts of foreign
investment flowed in.
Now, nearly thirty years after the start of economic reform in 1978,
China's economic structures have undergone dramatic changes. One of
the most significant changes is the relative decline of SOEs and other
State-controlled enterprises and the emergence of the private sector. Ac-
cording to a national census completed in 2003 on the composition of
China's economic entities, SOEs and enterprises with a controlling
share held by the State accounted for 56.2 percent of capital invested
and 49.6 percent of annual revenue among three million enterprises
that existed on December 31, 2001.24 Anecdotal evidence indicates that
further economic reform since 2001 has lowered the share of SOEs in
China's economy to about one-third.25 This is a remarkable contrast with
1978, when all enterprises were State-owned.
Despite the growing role of the private sector in China's economy,
private enterprises in China are mostly small. In fact, 99 percent of the
enterprises in China are small or medium size, with most of them
funded by private investment. 26 According to government statistics, by
the end of 2003, China's small and medium-sized enterprises accounted
for 55.6 percent of the country's GDP, 74.7 percent of industrial produc-
tion value added, 58.9 percent of retail sales, 46.2 percent of tax reve-
nues, and 62.3 percent of exports. 27 Nevertheless, SOEs remain the
largest enterprises in China, mainly concentrated in important indus-
tries, such as electricity, petroleum, railroads, aviation, telecommunica-
tions, and banking.
24 See STATE BUREAU OF STATISTICS, REPORT ON THE SECOND NATIONAL CENSUS ON BASIC
ECONOMIC ENTITIES (Jan. 17, 2003), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/jbdwpcgb/
qgjbdwpcgb/t20030117_61467.htm.
25 See Yingqiu Liu, The General Trends and Problems of China's Private Economic Sectors, J.
CHINESE AcAD. SOC. SCI., June 2006, http://www.cpes.cass.cn/viewnfo.asp?id=351.
26 Id.
27 See Non-Public Economy Blooming in China, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, July 28, 2004,
http://english.people.com.cn/200407/28/eng2OO4O728_151132.html.
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B. CHINA'S REGULATORY CONTEXT
At the same time that China's economic structure underwent funda-
mental changes, the regulatory structure in China was being trans-
formed to one more compatible with the requirements of a market
economy. Before China's economic reforms, China's economic system
was modeled after that of the former Soviet Union. For almost every
major industry, a corresponding ministry existed within the government
to control, manage, and coordinate production. There was no need for
government "regulation," as the word is used in Western countries; the
industries were already directly owned and managed by the State. But
when China began to reduce central direction of its economy after the
commencement of its economic reforms, it faced the question of what
industries to regulate, and how.
Realizing the problems associated with undue government interven-
tion in the economy, the Chinese government made a strategic choice
to retreat from such "non-essential" industries as machinery, electronics,
chemicals, and textiles. Those industries do not tend to create condi-
tions of "natural monopoly," do not impinge upon national security and
public goods, and usually are not regulated in market economies. In
several rounds of government restructuring since 1978, China has grad-
ually dissolved the government ministries overseeing such industries
and has replaced them with so-called "chambers of commerce" or "trade
associations" representing and coordinating various interests in those
industries. 28
In industries considered key to China's national security and eco-
nomic development, such as electricity, petroleum, banking, insurance,
railroads, and aviation, the Chinese government has chosen to retain or
strengthen its dominant role. In those key industries, the major firms
remain mostly State-owned. As a result, the government plays two roles:
it is both the owner of the major players and the referee, i.e., the regula-
tor. We believe this double role is detrimental to the development of
China's market economy. Among the steps that have been taken to ad-
dress this problem, the foremost has been to establish separate regula-
tory agencies for the key industries and to strip the SOEs in those
industries of the regulatory power given to them in the planned-econ-
omy era. In so doing, the Chinese government hopes to separate the
government's functions as a producer and as a regulator. For example,
between 1998 and 2004, China established the Insurance Regulatory
28 Leiming Wang, Lutao Shen & Sheng Zou, Five Comprehensive Government Restructures
1982-2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 6, 2003, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
shizheng/252/10434/10435/20030306/937651.html.
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Commission, the Banking Regulatory Commission, and the Electric
Power Regulatory Commission, which are charged with overseeing the
insurance, banking, and electricity industries, respectively. The largest
enterprises in those three industries, all State-owned, along with enter-
prises of other ownership forms that may emerge in the future, are sub-
ject to regulation by those new agencies. Furthermore, to strengthen
government control of SOEs in key industries and to stop the rapid loss
of state assets, China in 2003 established the State Assets Supervision
and Management Commission to oversee the operation of State-owned
assets.
C. CHINA'S LEGAL CONTEXT
As China's economy is being transformed from centrally planned to
market-oriented, China's legal system is undergoing parallel changes.
China's legislature focused on economic laws during most of the past
thirty years, most notably laws on contract, bankruptcy, corporations,
foreign investment, securities, and the like. The AML is another exam-
ple of China's efforts to guide economic behavior by reliance on well-
defined rules of law.
Although China has enacted many needed economic laws, the en-
forcement of such laws often is less than satisfactory. Various govern-
ment agencies charged with implementing the government's regulatory
policies have the authority to enforce economic statutes and regulations
in their respective areas. Similarly, enforcement of the AML will be car-
ried out by the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Agency, an administrative
agency. Enforcement by administrative agencies in China, however, in
many cases is not transparent or predictable. First, the rulemaking
processes at the administrative agencies are not subject to uniform stan-
dards, as China has yet to have a law specifying the procedures adminis-
trative agencies are required to follow when making regulations.2 9
Second, under the Administrative Litigation Law enacted in 1989, ac-
tions by administrative agencies are subject to judicial review by the Peo-
ple's Courts. The quality of the judicial review provided by the
Administrative Litigation Law, however, is quite limited. Among the
problems with judicial review of administrative actions most cited by
commentators are the narrow scope and convoluted procedures of the
review, and the persistent bias in favor of government agencies.3 0
29 Efforts to adopt an administrative procedure law, however, have been underway
since 2002.
30 For more details on China's judicial review of administrative actions, see Chris X.
Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'YJ. 9
(2003).
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The People's Courts have problems of their own keeping up with the
demands placed on them by China's burgeoning economy. Although
the Chinese Constitution states that the People's Courts shall exercise
their judicial power independently, in practice there is not much institu-
tional guarantee of judicial independence. Further complicating the
matter is the lack of experience of most Chinese judges with complex
cases. Until recently, a large portion of Chinese judges were selected
from retired military officers. Those judges generally have no formal
legal training or experience, and are ill-equipped to handle complicated
cases. Although the overall quality of Chinese judges has improved in
recent years, it remains doubtful whether Chinese judges-most of
whom are not trained in economics or experienced in business-will be
competent to handle antitrust cases brought under the AML. Finally,
the lack of stare decisis in China will also reduce the effectiveness of
judicial interpretation of the AML. China's civil law tradition leaves no
place for 'Judge-made" law. Although the Supreme People's Court has
the power to interpret laws as they arise from legal cases, its legal inter-
pretations cannot be cited by other courts and do not serve as prece-
dents as they would in common law countries. This means that potential
litigants cannot base expectations of what courts will do under a particu-
lar factual circumstance on prior decisions under similar circumstances.
Indeed, there is no mechanism for doing so-judges in China generally
do not write, much less publish, detailed opinions. Expectations about
the behavior of courts are thus difficult to form.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE DRAFTING AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AML AND CHINA'S
BROADER COMPETITION POLICY REFORMS
The most significant competition policy issues in China are inextrica-
bly tied to the fundamental issues arising from China's historic transfor-
mation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. It is
those underlying issues, including the role of SOEs, perceived excessive
competition, mergers and acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign
investors, administrative monopolies, and the enforcement of the AML,
that posed the most significant challenges to China's antitrust policy-
makers in drafting the AML. How China will enforce the AML in light of
those issues will determine the effectiveness of the AML and define the
parameters of China's future competition policies.
A. THE ROLE Or SOEs
The primary goal of the AML is to encourage competition. It is the
lack of competition in China's economy in general, and in the State-
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owned sectors in particular, that prompted China to start its efforts to
enact a comprehensive antitrust law. In recent years, however, China has
also sought to strengthen the role of SOEs in certain key sectors. This
posed a challenge to China's antitrust policymakers in bringing the
SOEs into the framework established by the AML.
Despite the significant progress China had made in other aspects of
its economic reforms, by the early 1990s SOEs still accounted for an
overwhelming percentage of China's economy. Market entry was tightly
controlled by the government in almost every sector. Consumers were
left with no meaningful choice but to patronize State-approved SOEs,
generating what many consider undeservedly high profits for those
'SOEs. Complaints abounded about the SOEs' abuse of their market
power. Perhaps not coincidentally, after China decided to accelerate the
market-oriented reforms in 1992, in 1994 it also started the legislating
process for its first comprehensive antitrust law.
Since the early 1990s, when China began its efforts to enact a compre-
hensive antitrust law, it also has implemented various ad hoc measures
aimed at introducing more competition into the stagnant sectors con-
trolled by SOEs. The government, as owner of the SOEs, broke up many
into multiple entities intended to compete with one another. The re-
structuring of China's telecommunication industry serves as an exam-
ple. Before 1994, China's telecommunication industry was monopolized
by China Telecom. In 1994, the Chinese government formed China
Unicom, a telecommunication provider chartered to compete with
China Telecom in mobile phone and pager services. In 1999, China
Telecom was broken up into two separate entities: China Mobile pro-
vided mobile phone services, and a new China Telecom provided
landline services. In the same year, the Chinese government issued
landline licenses to several newly formed companies to compete with
the newly formed China Telecom. In the next round of restructuring in
2002, China Telecom was further divided and integrated with other tele-
communication companies to form two "competing" landline providers:
China Netcom based in northern China and China Telecom based in
southern China.
While China has reduced the role of SOEs in most economic sectors,
the SOEs still exercise very significant, or even increased, control in cer-
tain sectors deemed to be of strategic importance to China's economy.
Eighty percent of the assets controlled by SOEs in 2006 were concen-
trated in eight "strategic sectors," such as petroleum and electricity gen-
eration. SOEs accounted for almost all of the production of petroleum,
natural gas, and ethylene, provided all of the basic telecommunication
services, generated approximately 55 percent of electricity, and flew
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about 82 percent of passengers and cargo through the country's air
transportation system."
Indeed, at the same time that China was drafting the AML, China also
made it a stated goal to maintain the dominant role of SOEs in certain
sectors. On December 18, 2006, the State Assets Supervision and Man-
agement Commission announced that seven "strategic" industries, in-
cluding national defense, electrical power generation and grids,
petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation,
and waterway transportation, will be controlled by SOEs.12 The govern-
ment aims to increase State capital in those seven industries and seeks to
maintain "absolute control" of them by SOEs. 3 The State Assets Supervi-
sion and Management Commission also announced that it is China's
goal to foster thirty to fifty large "internationally competitive" SOEs in
those industries by 2010. 34 In other important industries (but less impor-
tant than the seven strategic industries), including automobiles, steel,
and technology, the government will seek to maintain "somewhat strong
influence" by State capital on the leading companies.3 5
China seems to have two contradictory objectives for SOEs. On one
hand, it wants to rein in the monopolistic power of SOEs through the
adoption of the AML and other reforms; on the other hand, it wants to
retain the absolute control of SOEs in certain important sectors. 36 How
to reconcile these two objectives contributed to the prolonged debate
on the draft AML. Now that the AML has been enacted, balancing these
two objectives in the enforcement of the AML will to a large extent de-
termine the overall effectiveness of the AML.
When deciding on enforcement priorities under the AML, China's
antitrust policy makers should consider that maintaining State owner-
ship is not necessarily incompatible with encouraging competition. State
31 See Breaking Up Monopolies Key to the Restructuring of SOEs, LIAOWANG, Dec. 13, 2006,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/13/content_5480196.htm.
32 See State Assets Supervision and Management Commission, Guidance on the Re-
structuring of State Capital and State Owned Enterprises (Dec. 18, 2006), http://finance.
sina.com.cn/g/20061218/11133173443.shtml; see also SOEs to Maintain Overwhelming Con-
trol in Seven Sectors, XINHUA NET, Dec. 19, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/
2006-12/19/content_5504591 .htm.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 In truth, it is not at all clear whether China needs to maintain strong controls by
SOEs in what it considers to be strategic or important economic sectors. At least one
prominent economist has pointed out that the purpose of such State ownership in those
sectors can be accomplished equally well by strict government regulations and strict law
enforcement. See Lawrence Lau, The DualDilemmas of SOE Reforms, CAIJING MAGAZINE, Oct.
31, 2005, http://www.ccmedu.com/bbs2_4724.html.
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ownership of companies in an industry should not be equated with con-
ferring monopoly status on a particular company or a particular group
of companies. It is entirely possible to have State ownership of the com-
panies in an industry, and yet to have the State ownership dispersed in
dozens, or even hundreds, of SOEs competing against each other and
against private firms.17 Furthermore, even if China were to decide to
grant some type of exclusive status-and thus market power-to the key
SOEs in the strategic sectors, such a decision need not be a license for
the SOEs to abuse the market power thus granted.
China has already taken steps to introduce more competition into sec-
tors dominated by SOEs. As in the case of the telecommunication indus-
try, China has created more competition among SOEs in certain sectors
by breaking up one SOE into multiple entities. In addition, China has
taken steps to create more competition between SOEs and private enter-
prises by allowing private enterprises to enter sectors that were previ-
ously off limits. On February 25, 2005, China's State Council promul-
gated the Opinions on Encouraging, Supporting, and Guiding the De-
velopment of Private Capital and Other Non State-Owned Capital (2005
Opinions)."' The 2005 Opinions specifically allowed private capital to
enter sectors, such as electricity, telecommunications, railroad, civil avia-
tion, petroleum, public utilities, financial services, social services, and
national defense. More importantly, the 2005 Opinions allowed market
entry by private enterprises as long as such entry is not expressly prohib-
ited by the law, and allowed market entry by domestic private enter-
prises if foreign investors are allowed such entry.
China's efforts to introduce more competition in sectors previously
monopolized by SOEs and to open up more sectors to private enter-
prises have yielded some successes. In the civil aviation industry, for ex-
ample, four private airlines have come into operation since 2005.39 In
the telecommunications industry, one private company has been al-
lowed to provide call center services.40 These successes notwithstanding,
China still has a long way to go in terms of promoting competition in
37 Some argue, however, that SOEs may have stronger incentives to act anticompeti-
tively. See David E.M. Sappington &J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned Enter-
prises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479 (2003). For SOEs to compete efficiently, competition must
be an explicit goal of the government as equity owner in the firms.
3 State Council Doc. No. [2005] 3, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/
PI-c/795128.htm (unofficial Chinese text).
39 The four private airlines are Aokai Airlines, based in Tianjin; Chunqiu Airlines,
based in Shanghai; Yinglian Airlines, based in Chengdu, Sichuan Province; and Dongxing
Airlines, based in Wuhan, Hubei Province.
40 The private company that was allowed to provide call center services was Dongxing
Guolu.
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the sectors controlled by SOEs. Although some of those sectors have
seen an increase in the level of competition, such competition is quite
often very limited and consumers still frequently have no alternative to
the SOEs. In the telecommunication industry, for example, the two
landline providers created by the government in 2002, China Netcom
and China Telecom, are based in mutually exclusive territories, and in
February 2007 the two companies signed an agreement not to compete
for landline customers in each other's territory.4' The need for a law like
the AML to address such a brazen restriction on competition is obvious.
The AML was enacted against this backdrop. The final AML tries to
strike a balance between promoting the dominant status of SOEs in im-
portant sectors and subjecting the SOEs in those sectors to the new anti-
trust regime. The AML states:
In SOE-controlled sectors concerning the health of national econ-
omy and national security and in sectors where state trading is author-
ized by law, the legal operations of the enterprises are protected by
law, yet the government will supervise and regulate the prices of the
goods and services provided by those enterprises to protect the inter-
ests of consumers and promote technology advancement.
42
The AML further states:
The enterprises referenced in the foregoing clause shall conduct
businesses in accordance with law, be honest, exercise strict self-disci-
pline, and be subject to the supervision of the public. Those enter-
prises shall not hurt the interests of consumers by virtue of their
dominant status or state trading status.43
While the AML specifically prohibits enterprises in strategic sectors-
all of which are SOEs currently-from hurting consumer interests by
virtue of their dominant status, it is not clear whether such prohibitions
will be vigorously enforced. China may be tempted to be lax on SOEs in
order to promote the growth and consolidation of SOEs in key sectors.
Such a course of action (or inaction) in our view would have serious
negative consequences. In setting enforcement priorities, China's anti-
trust policy makers need to bear in mind that the behemoth SOEs in
monopolized sectors create the most significant distortions in China's
economy, and that Chinese consumers would reap immediate benefits
41 See China Telecom and China Netcom Reaching Agreement Not to Compete for Landline Cus-
tomers, BEIJING MORNING DAILY, Feb. 27, 2007, http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2007-02-27/
01011391578.shtml.
42 AML, supra note 2, art. 7.
43 Id.
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from enforcing the AML against SOEs. Enforcing the AML against SOEs
will also advance China's goal of promoting the long-term growth of
SOEs. The current strength of China's SOEs in most sectors is not a
result of market competition, but of their monopoly status. Such SOEs
will not be able to compete internationally unless they can withstand
rigorous market competition. Enforcing the AML against SOEs will pro-
vide an important impetus for those SOEs to wean themselves from the
protective environment created by their domestic monopoly status.
Therefore, the SOEs that currently enjoy monopoly status should be
among China's top priorities in the enforcement of the AML.
Finally, although the AML may play an important role in opening up
to new competition sectors currently monopolized by SOEs, it alone will
not be sufficient for China to achieve that goal. The lack of competition
in SOE-controlled sectors is caused by the tight control of market entry
by the government. An effective way of promoting competition, there-
fore, is for the government to liberalize market entry. In addition, since
the government is the ultimate owner of the SOEs and could restructure
the SOEs as it chooses, the government could effectively promote com-
petition by further breaking up monopolistic SOEs.
B. PERCEIVED EXCESSIVE COMPETITION
In recent years, while China has been trying to curb the monopolistic
abuses of SOEs, China's policy makers have simultaneously become con-
cerned about a new threat-"excessive" or "malignant" competition. To
many outsiders, this contrast is perplexing, but fear of "excessive compe-
tition" is widespread in China. A Google search on the Chinese Internet
using the Chinese characters for "excessive competition" yielded ap-
proximately one million hits, most of which were press reports of in-
tense competition in various industries. The industries covered by those
press reports are diverse, including software, foods, travel agencies,
household appliances, telecommunications, maritime shipping,
pharmaceuticals, insurance, banking, waste recycling, machinery, mort-
gage, motor vehicles, periodicals, supermarkets, Internet services, steel,
textile and apparels, and even lotteries. The most egregious examples of
"malignant competition" reported by the Chinese media were the
following:
China's Central TV network reported in September 2006 that com-
petition in the maritime shipping industry that operates between
Shanghai and Japan reached a point where shipping companies in-
curred losses of $210 for each smaller container and $420 for a
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Antitrust L.J. 247 2008-2009
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
larger container. That implies a loss of $760,000 per week for an
average shipping company.
44
" In recent years, competition among China's dairy producers has
been so intense that many of them resort to illegal means of cutting
costs, resulting in scandalous incidents, such as poisonous, recycled,
and contaminated milk.4
5
* In China's household appliances industry, there is a widespread
practice of libelous advertisement against competitors in the media
to gain market share. 46
* In the travel agency industry, it is not uncommon to have "zero" or
even "negative" fees for tours, meaning that many travel agencies
are paying customers to take tours with them.
47
* "Malignant competition" manifests itself not only in China's domes-
tic industries, but also in the country's export sector. In recent
years, Chinese products have been the number one targets of anti-
dumping investigations initiated by members of the WTO. Many in-
dustry experts and top officials in China blame the excessive
competition among China's exporters for this situation.
48
Needless to say, "excessive competition" has become a major per-
ceived problem in the Chinese economy. Some policy makers believe
that most of China's industries, except those in which the government
deliberately maintains monopolies by SOEs, are characterized by "exces-
sive competition." 49
Partly because of these perceptions, the government has taken some
measures to rein in "excessive competition." Most of those measures in-
volve what is called "industrial self-discipline," adopted under the direct
supervision of the government. Under the practice of "industrial self-
44 Malignant Competition Among SOEs in Shanghai's Maritime Shipping Industry, http://
news.tom.com/2006-09-22/0016/78319004.html.
45 Daiy Companies' Trust Crisis, ECONOMIC REFERENCE NEWSPAPER, July 31, 2005, http://
chanye.finance.sina.com.cn/sp/2005-0 7 -13/256435.shtml.46 Ge Ling, Malignant Competition Rampant in China's Household Appliances Industry, PEO-
PLE'S DAILY ONLINE, May 11, 2005, http://homea.people.com.cn/GB/41394/
3379837.html.
47 Low Price Competition, Malicious Cycle: What China's 10,000 Travel Agencies Should Do?
XINHUA NET, Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/wangtan/djjz/lxsdjjz.htm.
48 See, e.g., Long Yongtu: Excessive Competition Among Domestic Companies the Root Cause of
Antidumping Cases, June 13, 2005, http://finance.anhuinews.com/system/2005/06/13/
001282695.shtml.
49 See Selected Comments on the Draft AML, NPC Standing Committee, June 30, 2006,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350218&pdmc=
110106.
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discipline," the major companies in an industry reach price agreements
or other agreements to limit competition, in an effort to stabilize the
market.50 The trade associations that were converted from government
ministries played important roles in the adoption of this "industrial self-
discipline." Indeed, this practice was officially sanctioned by the govern-
ment in 1998.51
Meanwhile, the government has also stepped up its efforts to limit
competition among China's exporters to reduce their exposure to anti-
dumping investigations by foreign governments. For instance, in 2003
the government imposed an "advance approval" requirement for the ex-
port of thirty-six goods. 52 Under the requirement, exporters must first
submit their export contracts to the respective trade associations for ap-
proval prior to export. Policies such as "industrial self-discipline" and
"advance approval" to a large degree function simply as government-
sponsored price cartels. However, in implementing those policies, the
government apparently was unconcerned about their antitrust implica-
tions in domestic markets. 5
In the face of widespread claims of excessive competition, some of
China's policy makers even questioned whether China needs to have an
antitrust law when the competition in most sectors of China's economy
is already excessive. 54 To many, China's problem is not that there is too
little competition, but that there is too much. What China needs, they
believe, is to consolidate the smaller companies into bigger and stronger
ones that can compete in the international markets. 55 The views of those
policy makers seem to have been reflected in the AML, where a provi-
sion emphasizes that "voluntary" combinations through "fair competi-
50 For example, faced with growing inventory and price drops, China's nine TV pro-
ducers held a meeting in southern China in June 2000 to limit TV production and fix
prices. The attempted price cartel was not successful, however.
51 See State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), Opinions on Self-Disciplinary Prices
Adopted by Some Industries, Aug. 17, 1998, http://www.law999.net/law/doc/cO01/1998/
08/17/00107286.html. Ironically, before its abolition in the 2003 government restructur-
ing, SETC was one of a few government agencies in charge of drafting the AML.
52 See MOFCOM and Customs Authority Circular 36 of 2003, Advance Approval Require-
ment for the Export of Thirty-Six Goods, Nov. 29, 2003, http://www1.customs.gov.cn/
Default.aspx?TabID=433&InfoID=l 1070&SettingModuleID=1427.
53 The antitrust problems associated with those competition-limiting policies were per-
haps first brought to the attention of the Chinese policy makers by three antitrust lawsuits
filed in the United States in 2005 and 2006 alleging price fixing by Chinese exporters of
Vitamin C, magnesite, and bauxite.
54 See Selected Comments on the Draft AML, supra note 49.
55 See, e.g., id., Comments by Mr. Zheng Gongcheng.
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tion" to "expand operation scale and improve competitiveness in the
market" will be allowed.56
China's concerns with perceived excessive competition are also re-
flected in several provisions in the AML dealing with trade associations.
As discussed above, China's policymakers see a positive role of the gov-
ernment-agencies-turned-trade associations in regulating market order.
There is a risk, however, that the trade associations may cross the line
and impose undue restrictions on competition or, in some cases, func-
tion as outright price cartels. The final version of the AML seeks to
strike a balance between allowing legitimate activities of the trade as-
sociations and limiting the anticompetitive aspects of those activities. In
one provision, the AML states that "trade associations shall strengthen
industrial self-discipline and channel enterprises in their respective in-
dustries into lawful competition, in order to maintain the order of mar-
ket competition."57 In another provision, the AML states that "trade
associations shall not organize enterprises in their industries to engage
in monopolistic activities prohibited under this Chapter [Monopolistic
Agreements] ."58
Despite these signs of compromise between promoting competition
and ensuring market stability, it is clear that the balance in the AML is
slightly tilted towards the latter. Nowhere is this bias more vividly dis-
played than in the exceptions to monopolistic agreements written into
the AML. After laying out a general prohibition of monopolistic agree-
ments, the AML enumerates several types of agreements that will be ex-
empted from the prohibition. The exempted agreements not only cover
agreements for purposes of product standardization and environmental
protection, but also include "agreements reached during economic re-
cessions for purposes of alleviating declines in sales volumes or produc-
tion over-capacity," as well as "agreements reached for purposes of
protecting the legitimate interests of international trade and foreign ec-
onomic cooperation." 59
Despite claims of widespread excessive competition and its destabi-
lizing effects, it is important that China should not let the bias in favor
of market stabilization evident in the text of the AML tie the hands of
56 AML, supra note 2, art. 5 ("Enterprises may voluntarily consolidate and conduct law-
ful combinations through fair competition to expand business scopes and increase com-
petitiveness."). See also The Draft AML Both Prevents Monopolies and Allows Bigger and Stronger
Enterprises, XINHUA NEWS NET,June 24, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-06/
24/content_6284628.htm.
57 AML, supra note 2, art. 11.
5 Id. art. 16.
59 Id. art. 15.
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the antitrust regulators in the enforcement of the law. First, the term
"excessive competition" as it is understood in China is a misnomer. Most
examples of claimed excessive competition found in China's economy
are not examples of there being too much competition; rather, they are
examples of competition going awry. Common to almost all is the fact
that the competitors have engaged in illegal, or even criminal, acts that
violate the existing competition laws, product safety laws, and consumer
protection laws or would have violated the AML were it in effect. The
fact that such practices are widespread in China only underscores,
rather than detracts from, China's need to strictly enforce the existing
laws and the AML. Only through effective enforcement of such laws can
competition deliver maximum benefits to consumers.
Second, to the extent that the claimed excessive competition does sig-
nify an abundance of lawful competition, it should be welcomed, not
restricted. Competition itself should always be welcomed, especially
when it is not good for competitors. Competition of the kind the anti-
trust law is intended to promote can never be "excessive." The experi-
ence of the United States during the Great Depression provides a
valuable lesson. During the Great Depression it was widely believed in
the United States that "excessive" competition was responsible for defla-
tionary price pressures and unemployment. The Roosevelt administra-
tion made various attempts to limit price competition. These policies
are now seen as unsound-they harmed consumers and probably pro-
longed the Great Depression, which was not caused by "excessive" com-
petition. The U.S. Supreme Court during the Great Depression also
wavered on whether the antitrust laws should be strictly enforced when
increasing competition and falling prices were causing widespread dis-
tresses in the economy in the famous case of Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States.60 Fortunately, the Court eventually reversed its course.61 As
noted above, Article 15 of the AML exempts agreements among com-
petitors to alleviate declines in sales volumes and production over-capac-
0 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Similarly, as noted above, Article 15 of the AML exempts agree-
ments among competitors to alleviate declines in sales volumes and production over-ca-
pacity during economic downturns. See id.
61 The U.S. practice had been to treat price-fixing agreements as per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. In Appalachian Coals, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
creation of an exclusive joint selling agency by 137 Appalachian producers of bituminous
coal was reasonable and therefore did not violate the Sherman Act. In so holding, the
U.S. Supreme Court was greatly influenced by the dismal conditions in the industry
caused by the Great Depression. Seven years later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed course. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Supreme
Court rejected the approach it took in Appalachian Coals, and unequivocally reaffirmed
the per se rule for horizontal price fixing.
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ity during economic downturns, revisiting the erroneous economics of
Appalachian Coals.
In sum, although claims of excessive competition have prolonged the
debate on the drafts of the AML and the AML includes compromises to
accommodate the views of those arguing for market stability over com-
petition, China should not let the concerns about market stability crip-
ple the enforcement of the AML. Instead, China should make it a top
priority to ensure a high level of competition.
C. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF CHINESE COMPANIES BY
FOREIGN COMPANIES
A major goal of the AML is to deal with foreign investors acquiring
Chinese companies through mergers and acquisitions. Foreign investors
have played an important role in China's economic revival since the very
beginning of China's economic reforms almost three decades ago.
Upon China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, China agreed to reduce tariff levels drastically and made numer-
ous market access commitments regarding a number of industries. In
the years following China's WTO accession, foreign companies increas-
ingly steered their investment in China towards acquiring local Chinese
companies. An increasing number of mergers and acquisitions by for-
eign companies heightened China's concerns that its industries might
be dominated, or even controlled, by foreign companies.
In response, China imposed many ad hoc limitations on mergers and
acquisitions by foreign companies. A prominent example is the recent
intervention by the government in the acquisition by the U.S. private
equity firm Carlyle Group of Xugong Construction Machinery, China's
leading manufacturer of heavy construction equipment. It was reported
that Carlyle Group initially signed an agreement in October 2005 to buy
85 percent of Xugong's shares. The deal was fiercely opposed by govern-
ment officials, however, as well as by Xugong's rivals. About one year
later, Carlyle Group agreed to take a less than 50 percent stake in
Xugong in exchange for the government approval of the acquisition.62
The ad hoc limitations imposed on mergers and acquisitions by for-
eign companies are part of China's broader efforts to scale back foreign
investment in certain sensitive sectors. Although China has more or less
fulfilled its market access commitments since its accession to the WTO,
it has also revoked some of the preferential treatments previously ac-
62 See Carlyle Agrees to Hold Minority of Xugong's Shares, SOHU Bus. ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://business.sohu.com/20061017/n245845506.shtml.
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corded to foreign investors and, in some cases, has put in place some
new restrictions.63 Coincidentally or not, the flow of foreign investment
into China has shown signs of leveling off in recent years. 64
China may be tempted to use competition policy as an additional tool
to achieve its goal of limiting foreign investment in certain sectors. The
promulgation of the 2006 M&A Rules is seen by many as the first step in
that direction. When drafts of the AML were being discussed, many mul-
tinational corporations feared that they would become the law's first
targets.65 This fear was reinforced when a Chinese court in early 2007
decided to hear antitrust claims filed by a local Chinese company
against a prominent multinational company. 6  Although the final text of
the AML does not single out foreign companies, except in a provision
requiring "national security review" in mergers and acquisitions of do-
mestic companies by foreign companies, 67 there is a risk that the AML
will primarily target foreign companies. Unlike all of the controversial
topics surrounding the debates on the AML, the necessity of limiting
entry by foreign companies in key sectors is one of the few concepts on
which China's policymakers have a near consensus. The United States
has similar concerns, limiting foreign ownership of broadcast stations,
airlines, and merchant vessels.
China's antitrust regulators should guard against the risk of singling
out foreign companies in enforcing the AML. Although China may be
rightly concerned about possible aggressive campaigns by behemoth
multinational corporations to monopolize Chinese domestic markets, it
63 For example, on March 16, 2007, China's National People's Congress adopted the
amended Corporate Income Tax Law that would abolish the preferential corporate tax
treatment currently enjoyed by foreign-invested companies. In December 2005, China's
Securities Regulatory Commission imposed a moratorium on new foreign investment in
Chinese securities brokerages. In August 2006, China's Banking Regulatory Commission
announced a requirement that foreign banks incorporate their local operations in China
if they want to engage in RMB-denominated business with Chinese individuals. While
these restrictions technically do not violate China's WTO commitment, and some indeed
may be well justified, foreign investors have criticized them as steps in the wrong direc-
tion. See Statement of John R. Dearie, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic Secur-
ity Review Commission (Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/
writtentestimonies/06_08_22_23wrts/06_08_22_23_deariejohn.php.
64 In 2006, China saw a 4 percent decrease in foreign investment compared with the
year before. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, China Gets Cold Feet for Foreign Investment: New Regula-
tions Spawn Fears of Economic Nationalism, WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 2007, at DI.65 See Rebecca Buchman, China Hurries Antitrust Law, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at A7.
OnJanuary 17, 2007, The Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People's Court heard claims
by a local Chinese company that Sony and its joint venture in China engaged in unfair
competition by designing their digital cameras to shut down when batteries made by com-
petitors are installed. The court did not rule at the end of the hearing and the case is still
pending.
67 See AML, supra note 2, art. 31.
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would be a grave mistake to allocate most resources to fighting foreign-
controlled monopolies when such monopolies are not a major threat.",
The losses to consumer welfare caused by the anticompetitive acts of
domestic companies are no less real than the losses to consumer welfare
caused by the anticompetitive acts of foreign companies, and indeed,
the degree of monopolization by foreign companies-often exagger-
ated in the Chinese media-is far less than the degree of monopoliza-
tion in the industries controlled by SOEs. To focus the AML on foreign
companies, or to enforce strictly the AML only against foreign compa-
nies, would lead to missed opportunities to address a major source of
distortion in China's economy.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLIES
One of the most important features of the AML is the devotion of an
entire chapter to the issue of "administrative monopolies." The AML
does not give a definition of administrative monopoly. But, as suggested
by the name, administrative monopolies are monopolies created by ad-
ministrative agencies. Chapter Five of the AML sets forth the general
principles dealing with governmental actions that have the intent or ef-
fect of creating monopolistic conditions. It specifically lists several cate-
gories of governmental actions that would be prohibited: mandated use
of products and services, regional blockades, restrictions on bidding, re-
strictions on market entry, and restrictions on competition. 69
The inclusion of the prohibition of administrative monopolies in the
AML has a tortuous history. The prohibition appeared in the first sev-
eral drafts released for comments beginning in 2002. It was reported,
however, that in December 2005 the State Council deleted the entire
chapter of the draft law dealing with administrative monopolies from an
internal draft and only kept a declaratory statement prohibiting admin-
istrative monopolies in principle in the general rules section.7" In June
2006, the State Council officially approved a draft that did not contain
the chapter on administrative monopolies. 1 But several weeks later,
68 According to a government report released in September 2007, China does not face
an imminent risk of monopolies by foreign companies in any industry. SeeJiang Wei, No
Threat of Foreign Monopoly in Any Industry, CHINA DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2007, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-09/10/content_6092857.htm.
69 See AML, supra note 2, arts. 32-37.
70 See Xiaodong Xie, Anti-Administrative Monopolies Chapter Deleted in Entirety from Draft
Antimonopoly Law, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
54816/54822/4016799.html.
71 See State Council Approves Draft Antimonopoly Law Without Chapter on Administrative Mo-
nopolies, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, June 8, 2006, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/
4448654.html.
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when the State Council submitted the draft law to the NPC Standing
Committee for its first reading, the chapter on administrative monopo-
lies had been reinserted.72 These unusual changes in the text of the
draft law reflect what perhaps was the biggest dilemma facing China's
antitrust policy makers-i.e., whether China should include provisions
prohibiting administrative monopolies in the new antitrust law.
The reason why the issue of administrative monopolies is so central to
the AML is because of the ubiquity of such monopolies in China. Ad-
ministrative monopolies manifest themselves in many kinds of govern-
mental actions. First, administrative monopolies result from governmen-
tal measures that are intended to restrict competition in a particular
industry or from governmental measures that compel certain anticom-
petitive conduct. For example, in 1999, China's Bureau of Civil Aviation
issued an order prohibiting airlines from offering air ticket discounts,
citing the adverse effect of price competition on the healthy develop-
ment of the airline industry.73
Second, administrative monopolies also result from governmental
measures that mandate the use of products or services by certain pro-
ducers that usually are "affiliate companies" of the government agen-
cies. Those affiliate companies are in most cases SOEs or former SOEs
currently or previously controlled by the government agencies in ques-
tion. A good example of this practice is that some local civil affairs agen-
cies in charge of issuing marriage licenses require applicants to take
pictures to be affixed to marriage licenses only at designated photo stu-
dios. Such steering of business towards affiliated companies using gov-
ernment power is declared illegal under Article 32 of the AML.
Third and most important, administrative monopolies also result
from governmental actions that restrict market entry. This problem is
more serious at the local level, where the local governments are notori-
ously known for creating various barriers to firms from other localities.
This local protectionism is what is commonly known as "regional block-
age" and is declared illegal under Article 33 of the AML.
Each of the three variants of administrative monopolies is made possi-
ble by the ability of governmental agencies, at both the central and local
levels, and with or without statutory authority, to require government
approvals for a wide range of economic activities. According to a survey
72 See Na Liu, Draft Antimonopoly Law on Schedule for Review; Chapter on Administrative
Monopolies Added Back In, ECON. OBSERVER, June 25, 2006, http://info.finance.hc360.
com/2006/06/25102650097.shtml.
73 However, the ban on discount air tickets was frequently ignored by the airlines, and
the ban was finally lifted in early 2003.
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conducted by the State Council, in 2003 there were a total of 4,159
projects in which approvals of some sort from various governmental
agencies were required, and more than 2,000 approval requirements
were implemented without any legal basis. 74 To make things worse, in
many cases businesses have to navigate through the maze of those ap-
proval requirements without clear guidance from the governmental
agencies.
The following statistics provide a clue to the seriousness of the prob-
lem of administrative monopolies in China. It is reported that from 1995
to 2004, the SAIC investigated 5,642 cases of monopolies pursuant to
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 519 of which were administrative mo-
nopolies. 75 The same report stated that since its establishment in 2003,
MOFCOM has reviewed 432,841 policies of local governments that alleg-
edly contained elements of regional blockades, pursuant to the 2001
Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities.
Of those 432,841 policies, 301 were modified or annulled by
MOFCOM. 76 On the face of these statistics, it may seem that administra-
tive monopolies constitute only an insignificant part of the total cases
being investigated or reviewed. The source of the statistics, however, ob-
served that this is a result of selection bias, as the government authori-
ties were reluctant to investigate or confront administrative monopolies
because of what they saw as the futility of such actions.77
When drafting the AML, China's antitrust policymakers faced real
challenges on whether-and how-to bring administrative monopolies
into the new framework. On one hand, as the ubiquity of administrative
monopolies has made them the major source of monopolies in China's
economy, China's antitrust policy makers felt obliged to address them in
the AML. Many commentators believed that without provisions prohibit-
ing administrative monopolies, the AML would necessarily be incom-
plete and would lose much of its relevance. 78 Furthermore, without a
prohibition of administrative monopolies, the public may believe that
the government does not have the resolve to fight monopolies at all and
may discount the credibility of the other provisions of the law.
74 SeeJianjun Wang, Special Interests the Greatest Obstace to Market Development, LIAowANG
NEWS WKLY, Dec. 13, 2006, http://news.sohu.com/20061213/n247014585_1.shtml.
75 See Anti-Administrative Monopolies Chapter Deleted in Entirety from the AML, PEOPLE'S
DAILY ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/54816/54822/4016799.
html.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., YaJie, Antimonopoly Law Must Address Administrative Monopolies, CHINA INDUS.
& Bus. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, available at http://biz.163.com/06/0419/10/2F2JTNE0002
1RH4.html.
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On the other hand, prohibiting administrative monopolies in the
AML may not yield many successes in the near future, given China's
current economic and political realities. Fighting administrative monop-
olies means taking on local governments, a task that even China's politi-
cal system is not ready to handle, let alone China's legal system.
Throughout the history of China, there has been the so-called "central
versus local governments" problem, i.e., the problem of enforcing the
orders and policies of the central government at the local level. 79 "The
mountain is high and the Emperor is far away." "Where there are poli-
cies from above, there are counter-policies from below." These old Chi-
nese sayings speak vividly to the troubled relationship between the
central and local governments. It is unlikely that China will be able to
use the AML to address local protectionism and "regional blockade"
and yet avoid this 3,000-year-old obstacle. Even for administrative mo-
nopolies created by the ministries of the central government, the ability
of the AML to force meaningful changes in the way the central govern-
ment conducts its business will be very limited, not least because China's
government system is still largely based on fiat, not rules of law.
Despite these challenges, the prohibition of administrative monopo-
lies is now in the final draft of the AML. Along with the SOEs in monop-
olized sectors, China's government agencies at various levels create most
of the restrictions on competition in China's economy, and the popular
appeal for taking on administrative monopolies under the AML is
enormous.
80
While the AML prohibits administrative monopolies, it also makes a
compromise that casts the effectiveness of the prohibition in doubt. In a
provision dealing with the legal liabilities for violating the prohibition of
administrative monopolies, the AML states:
79 The relationship between the central and local governments has been problematic
since the Zhou Dynasty (1122 B.C.-225 B.C.) and remains so today. One of the most
dramatic episodes of the "central versus local governments" problem is the civil war
waged by Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty in the 1670s against three feudal lords,
who were granted their fiefdoms as rewards for their contributions to the establishment of
the Qing Dynasty but who later grew defiant of the orders of the Emperor. The war,
spanning eight years and spreading to almost half of China's territory at the time, ended
with a complete victory for the Emperor.
80 China's antitrust rules prior to the AML already contained some variants of the pro-
hibition of administrative monopolies. For instance, Article 30 of the 1993 Anti-Unfair
Competition Law prohibits restrictions on competition by using administrative power
(supra note 3), and the 2001 Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Eco-
nomic Activities specifically bans regional blockades (supra note 9). Therefore, including
the prohibition of administrative monopolies in the AML preserves continuity in the
treatment of administrative monopolies.
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If government agencies and other organizations that are authorized
by law to possess the authority to regulate public affairs abuse their
administrative power and engage in activities that exclude or restrict
competition, such activities shall be ordered to be corrected by the
relevant superior government agencies. The officials and other personnel
who are directly responsible for such activities shall be punished by
law. The Anti-monopoly Enforcement Agency shall provide the superior
government agencies with advice as to how such officials or personnel
should be published by law.
81
It is clear from this provision that the enforcement of the prohibition
of administrative monopolies will be carried out by the superior govern-
ment agencies through fiats, not by the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Agency. The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency is only to play an advi-
sory role. This arrangement is a reluctant acknowledgement of the fact
that tackling administrative monopolies through the legal system in
China is still not feasible at this time.
Notwithstanding the inability of the Anti-monopoly Enforcement
Agency to enforce the AML against administrative monopolies, China
needs to actively pursue other reforms necessary to control administra-
tive monopolies. Otherwise, the most significant restrictions on competi-
tion in China's economy would be left intact. China's policy makers
need to bear in mind that the antitrust law is not the sole, or even the
most important, vehicle through which to address administrative mo-
nopolies. 82 The nature of administrative monopolies means that their
elimination will necessarily require other reforms, such as changes in
constitutional and government structure reforms. Indeed, in most devel-
oped countries, such as in the United States, administrative monopolies
are dealt with in the general antitrust law only to the extent that they are
a result of the action of the State as market participant. In dealing with
monopolistic conditions created by the State as sovereign and market
regulator, the United States generally leaves the job to the democratic
legislative processes at both the federal and state levels, while using cer-
tain important legal mechanisms-such as the "Dormant Commerce
81 AML, supra note 2, art. 51 (emphasis added).
82 It seems that China's antitrust policy makers are well aware of this point. An earlier
draft AML, released in June 2006, points out that the furtherance of reforms of the gov-
ernment functions are needed to rein in the abuse of administrative power that harms
competition.
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Clause '8 3 and the federalism doctrine 4-to correct any failures of the
democratic processes in this regard. China needs to push forward with
constitutional and government structure reforms that address the root
cause of administrative monopolies.
E. ENFORCEMENT OF THE AML
An important consideration in drafting any law in any country is how
the law is to be enforced. All the more so in China, where enforcement
of a law in many cases is a larger issue than the law itself. Debate on the
enforcement of the AML contributed to the AML's prolonged drafting
process. The effectiveness of the AML will in large part depend on set-
ting appropriate enforcement priorities and establishing correct and
clear expectations on the part of business entities.
1. Which Agency?
Prior to the AML, the responsibility for enforcing China's antitrust
rules is shared by three agencies: the SAIC as authorized by the 1993
Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the National Development and Reform
13 The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce in
the so-called Commerce Clause. By negative implication, the U.S. Supreme Court holds
that states do not have the power to regulate interstate commerce. This so-called Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine played a vital role in striking down state regulations that were
aimed at or had the effect of blockading the commerce of other states. See, e.g., Granholm
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (ruling that New York and Michigan laws allowing in-state
wineries to ship wine to consumers directly but prohibiting out-of-state wineries from do-
ing the same is unconstitutional); Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invali-
dating a New Jersey law that prohibited the importation of most solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside of the territorial limits of NewJersey); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (holding that New York may not protect its local
interests by limiting access to local markets by out-of-state milk sellers); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824) (invalidating New York's grant of steamboat monopoly).
84 Under the federalism doctrine, the U.S. federal government can only exercise
power granted by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has used the federalism
doctrine to invalidate federal laws that had the purpose or effect of limiting competition.
Most notably, in 1935, in the "sick chicken" case, the U.S. Supreme Court stuck down one
of the most dramatic efforts by the Roosevelt administration to stabilize the U.S. economy
during the Great Depression-the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Enacted to combat falling
prices and intensifying competition during the Great Depression, the NIRA authorized
the President, ordinarily upon application by trade associations, to promulgate "codes of
fair competition" for the trade or industry. Several hundred codes were adopted in accor-
dance with the NIRA. The codes usually contained provisions concerning minimum
wages and prices, maximum hours, and unfair trade practices. In 1935, the Supreme
Court struck down the entire Act, holding that in enacting the Act, Congress exceeded its
commerce power and unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power. Interestingly,
there seems to be a striking resemblance between the "codes of fair competition" author-
ized under the NIRA and the "industrial self-discipline" authorized by the Chinese gov-
ernment today. See discussion of the "industrial self-discipline," infra Part IV.B.
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Commission as authorized by the 2003 Provisional Rules on Prevention
of Monopoly Pricing, and MOFCOM as authorized by the 2006 M&A
Rules. Earlier drafts of the AML proposed the establishment of an Anti-
Monopoly Enforcement Agency under the State Council to enforce the
future AML. There was speculation that the Anti-Monopoly Enforce-
ment Agency would be created within an existing ministry. Given the
prominent roles SAIC and MOFCOM played in enforcing the pre-ex-
isting antitrust rules, these two agencies naturally became the leading
candidates to house the future Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency.
SAIC is primarily charged with the micromanagement of market activ-
ities, ranging from business and trademark registration to street market
regulation. SAIC has branches in virtually every city in China. At the
central level, SAIC has a Bureau of Fair Trade, under which there is an
Anti-monopoly Division. However, this division has only five staff mem-
bers. 85 In March 2004, SAIC released an investigative report that de-
scribed multinational companies' alleged anticompetitive behavior in
China. 6
The other candidate is MOFCOM, a powerful ministry created during
the government restructuring in 2003 that combined the former Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and many functions of
the former SETC. MOFCOM in late 2004 established an Anti-Monopoly
Investigation Office under the Department of Treaty and Law.8 7 This
office now has about the same level of staffing as its counterpart in
SAIC. Both agencies at MOFCOM and SAIC were designated to review
foreign acquisitions of domestic companies under the 2006 M&A
Rules.88 However, the Antitrust Filing Guidelines accompanying the
M&A Rules were issued by MOFCOM alone.
The AML eventually settled on a two-layer enforcement regime. The
law requires the establishment of an Anti-Monopoly Commission under
the State Council, whose functions include competition policy making,
issuance of investigative reports and assessments on market competition,
issuance of antitrust guidelines, and coordination of the enforcement of
the AML.89 It seems that the Anti-Monopoly Commission is intended to
85 See SAIC, Functions, Organization, and Staffing of the Bureau of Fair Trade, based on
information shown on Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zhzjg/jig-3.html.
86 See SAIC, Multinational Companies' Competition Restricting Behavior and Counter Mea-
sures, SAIC Pub. No. 5 (2004).
87 See MOFCOM Establishes Antimonopoly Investigation Office, CHINA NEWS NET, Sept. 17,
2004, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/661853.htm. Noticeably, this was a
few months after the release of the SAIC report on multinational companies.
88 See Rules on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 12.
89 AML, supra note 2, art. 9.
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be an inter-agency coordinative body on antitrust policy making. The
day-to-day enforcement of the AML will be carried out by the Anti-Mo-
nopoly Enforcement Agency.90
An early 2004 draft of the AML proposed to establish the Anti-Monop-
oly Enforcement Agency under MOFCOM, but later drafts retreated
from that position. The final AML states only that an Anti-Monopoly
Enforcement Agency will be "designated" by the State Council, without
specifying where. 91 This arrangement is a postponement of the decision
on the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency in order to secure faster en-
actment of the AML. Now the State Council could designate a com-
pletely new agency, or designate an agency sitting within an existing
ministry; either would be consistent with the language of the AML.
It would be in China's best interest to elect the first option, i.e., estab-
lishing an independent Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency that is not
subjugated to any existing ministry. This effectively means creating a
new agency under the State Council at the ministry level. The justifica-
tions for establishing such a high-level agency are twofold. First, the
Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency must possess enough indepen-
dence and authority to carry out its statutory functions. Although the
Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency is relieved of the duty to bring en-
forcement actions against other ministries or local governments for vio-
lations of the prohibition of administrative monopolies, it still needs to
take actions against SOEs in monopolized sectors, a task not much eas-
ier politically. For historical reasons, many, if not all, of the SOEs in
monopolized sectors are proteges of certain ministries. Taking on those
SOEs would essentially mean taking on the ministries behind them. In
enforcing the AML against those SOEs, the Anti-Monopoly Enforce-
ment Agency must not be influenced by other ministries and must pos-
sess the authority necessary to carry out its duties. Such independence
and authority can only be guaranteed by having a new agency at a very
high level-meaning the ministry level. Second, the Anti-Monopoly En-
forcement Agency would require an enormous amount of resources,
given the size of China's economy and the amount of anticompetitive
activities in the marketplace. Placing the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Agency under an existing ministry would force the Anti-Monopoly En-
forcement Authority to compete for resources allocated to the ministry
in which it sits and could seriously limit its performance. Indeed,
90 Id. art. 10 ("The agency designated by the State Council as the agency responsible
for antimonopoly enforcement (hereinafter "Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency") shall
be responsible for anti-monopoly enforcement under this law.").
91 Id.
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neither of the anti-monopoly offices established under MOFCOM and
SAIC so far seems to have enough manpower or resources to handle the
potentially vast amount of work required to enforce the AML.
2. Which Enforcement Priorities?
Given the limited institutional capability and resources at least at the
initial stage, China's future Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency will
need to set priorities for its enforcement goals. A good start is to focus,
first, on horizontal restraints of trade, especially cases of price fixing and
bid rigging, where large benefits can often be obtained for consumers
by breaking up cartels and introducing competition. Enforcement in
this area has high payoffs because it is likely to deter behavior that
harms consumers and unlikely to erroneously deter competitive behav-
ior that benefits consumers.
In countries with new competition policies, there is often a tendency
to focus on complex vertical relationships because of complaints about
these matters filed by competitors, and on consumer protection issues
because of popular appeal. Often, certain contracts or contractual
terms, or pricing schemes in general, may strike people as unfair, even if
they actually promote economic efficiency. Examples include vertical
price restraints, 9 2 "unfairly high price in selling or unfairly low price in
purchasing," "selling goods at below-cost prices for no reasonable rea-
sons," unilateral refusals to deal, exclusive dealerships, certain tying ar-
rangements, and price discrimination.93 In societies that are skeptical of
the legitimacy of markets, enforcement focusing on these issues often
illustrates the popular or ideological basis for the skepticism. Antitrust
action in these areas requires painstaking investigation and analysis, not
merely to decide whether the behavior in question is harmful or benefi-
cial to consumers, but also to avoid creating unintended deterrent ef-
fects on future economic activity that is beneficial to consumers. In
general, it is important to resist the temptation to give priority to investi-
gations that consume a vast amount of resources but have minimal
benefits.
Although the antitrust review of proposed mergers, acquisitions, and
joint ventures is a very useful device to avoid anticompetitive concentra-
tion (without the messy complication of ex post disassembly of a con-
summated transaction), the amount of work involved can easily be
overwhelming. Unfortunately, the AML applies to all consolidations that
meet the sales thresholds rather than just consolidations of competing
92 See id. art. 14.
93 See id. art. 17.
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firms. The effect could be to unnecessarily burden the Anti-monopoly
Enforcement Agency and increase the delays associated with obtaining
agency clearance for mergers with little or no potential for anticompeti-
tive effects, including many beneficial mergers. It is important for the
Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency to give quick clearance to mergers
that do not pose a competition issue and focus on those that have clear
overlaps. This implies the need for a limit on the amount of time trans-
actions are held up pending agency decisions on enforcement.
3. The Importance of Transparency and Consistency
For the AML to influence business behavior in the intended way, busi-
nesses need to form both correct and clear expectations about its en-
forcement. To allow business to establish such expectations, they must
be informed of the enforcement decisions of the Anti-Monopoly En-
forcement Agency. In addition, it is also necessary to have a rule that
plays the role of stare decisis in a common law system. That is, the Anti-
Monopoly Enforcement Agency must to some extent be bound by its
prior decisions and reasoning. If administrative agencies can decide
each case without regard to the ways in which similar facts have been
analyzed and treated in the recent past, businesses will have no basis to
form expectations about the consequences of their actions. The effect of
this is to increase the risks of doing business, thus discouraging invest-
ment by ruling out investment projects that do not have a sufficiently
high expected return to compensate investors for taking on the risk of
(erroneous) antitrust prosecution.
The requirement to publish enforcement decisions would be a good
first step to implement the AML in a transparent and consistent way. In
earlier drafts of the AML, the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency was
required to publish decisions. In the final version of the AML, however,
the language was changed from "must publish" to "may publish. 9 4 This
change seems to reflect a reluctance of the Chinese authorities to com-
mit to full disclosure of the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency's fu-
ture antitrust decisions, which is not helpful for businesses attempting to
form expectations about the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency's ac-
tions. This retreat from transparency and consistency may reflect the
likelihood that the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency may take into
account non-competition factors, such as the public interest and the
health of the national economy, in deciding competition cases. But here
as well, making the enforcement agency responsible for such broad con-
siderations would be a mistake. The agency's decisions will be subject to
94 See id. art. 44.
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political review, and it is in that review process that such considerations
may enter.
More generally, unless antitrust enforcers are to attempt to examine
every transaction in the economy, deterrence is the principal vector by
which antitrust (and most other) laws achieve their effects on economic
behavior. Deterrence of anticompetitive behavior, however, has a dark
side: inadvertent deterrence of efficient behavior. The deterrent effect
of a law or regulation is affected by the probability of detection and
successful prosecution (itself a function of enforcement resources), the
firm's understanding of the law, and the penalties expected to result
from successful prosecution. Very effective deterrence of anticompeti-
tive behavior will also deter procompetitive behavior if the law is unclear
to private decision makers or if private decision makers anticipate fre-
quent errors by prosecutors and judges.95 Thus, transparency and consis-
tency in enforcement are important in helping businesses form
expectations consistent with the intent of the law.
The AML gives private parties the right to judicial review if they are
not satisfied with the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency's decisions.
In the context of China's current legal system, it remains unclear
whether this right will increase the predictability of the process. As dis-
cussed in Part III.C, in general, the courts' ability to adjudicate antitrust
cases is doubtful at this time, as they do not seem to have the necessary
expertise. China's policymakers are aware of the inadequate capacity of
the courts in adjudicating antitrust cases under the AML. In some ear-
lier drafts, civil liabilities and recovery of damages through litigation
were emphasized. One draft even suggested a detailed methodology of
computing damages. Later drafts, however, minimized direct mention
of the courts' role. Apparently there is reluctance to rely on the judicial
system to handle antitrust cases.
The AML clearly contemplates reliance on the administrative, rather
than judicial, system as its primary enforcement mechanism. It is ex-
pected that China will issue detailed rules and regulations to implement
the AML before it takes effect on August 1, 2008. In the end, given
China's legal environment, as noted above, it is these rules and their
enforcement that will matter most. It would be inappropriate to evaluate
the AML as if it were a set of instructions intended for the judiciary to
interpret. To the extent that administrative agencies are more compe-
tent in carrying out the enforcement of the AML, it makes sense, at least
95 See generally Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Anti-
trust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2005).
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in the short term, to rely more on administrative decisions and
remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
China has come a long way since drafting of the AML began in 1994.
Compared with China's prior antitrust laws and regulations, the final
draft of the AML makes significant progress in terms of comprehensive-
ness, clarity, and consistency with economic principles. Despite the pro-
gress, however, China's antitrust policy makers still face significant
challenges in enforcing the AML and reforming the country's competi-
tion policies.
In enforcing the AML, China's antitrust regulators would do well to
focus on SOEs in monopolized sectors and need not be overly con-
cerned about the claimed excessive competition. China's antitrust regu-
lators should also guard against the temptation to enforce the AML
vigorously only against foreign companies. To guarantee the indepen-
dence, authority, and resources of the future Anti-Monopoly Enforce-
ment Authority, it should be established as an independent agency at
the ministry level. The new agency should carefully allocate its re-
sources, and the enforcement of the AML ideally should rely on deter-
rence built on correct and clear private expectations of enforcement
policy.
Although the AML will be an important tool to carry out China's com-
petition policy reforms, it is not the only one. The AML alone, for exam-
ple, cannot sufficiently address the problem of administrative
monopolies. Other reforms, such as SOE reforms, market entry liberali-
zation, constitutional and government structure reforms, and improve-
ments to the legal system, will be indispensable to China's goal of
promoting competition in its economy. In addition to enforcing the
AML, China needs to actively pursue these broader competition policy
reforms. The AML is but a beginning.
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